INTRODUCTION
"The time has come for mankind to make the rule of law in international affairs as normal as it is now in domestic affairs. Of course the structure of such law must be patiently built, stone by stone. The cost will be a great deal of hard work, both in and out of government particularly in the universities of the world. Plainly one foundation stone of this structure is the International Court of Justice … [and] the obligatory jurisdiction of that Court. … One final thought on rule of law between nations: we will all have to remind ourselves that under this system of law one will sometimes lose as well as win. But … if an international controversy leads to armed conflict, everyone loses." President Dwight D Eisenhower 1 Those who believe that good governance should start at home and extend abroad will easily agree but may be surprised at the source of the quote and be more optimistic about its achievement. In this lecture, I will argue that the emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned two of the most cosmopolitan professions, the law and the military, into the least cosmopolitan. . Those who are surprised by the source of the quote should recall that this soldier turned politician used federal troops to protect a black student in Little Rock and warned of the military industrial complex. In Delhi, the old warrior who had masterminded the 6 June Normandy landings of the 'United Nations' (a phrase used in newspapers on that day) made his plea for law not war.
outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers and soldiers can and should play in it.
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WESTPHALIAN STATES AND TWO COSMOPOLITAN PROFESSIONS
Pepo, Bologna and pre-Westphalian professions
The gradual evolution of the institutions that gave rise to universities means that there is no precise date for when particular institutions became 'universities' and which can claim the mantle of the 'first'. 3 Some ancient bodies might claim as much right to call themselves 'universities' as the eleventh and twelfth century European centres of learning in Bologna, Paris and Oxford. China's Nanjing (c200), Morocco's Al-karouine (859) and Egypt's Al Azar (975) could claim to be the oldest continuing universities while India's Odantapuri (c550 BC to c1040 AD) and Jalanda (c450 BC to 1193 AD) have respectable claim to the be the earliest institutions that could be called universities. Although predated by a medical school at Salerno, the institution with the claim to be the first university in Europe is the University of Bologna and there is evidence of law lectures being given by the monk Pepo as early as 1076. 4 Universities and university law teaching thus predated the modern state by nearly six centuries (and predating the joint stock company, which they have latterly been encouraged to emulate, by nearly eight centuries). They were originally among the most cosmopolitan of institutions.
The students of the time learnt Roman Law, Canon Law and, as it developed, the Law Merchant.
5
Such law was not made by territorial sovereigns but was developed by jurists, priests and traders and covered most of Mediaeval Europe. Indeed, the re-emergence of international trade involved issues which the existing local laws were not equipped to address but which the preserved Roman law could.
Accordingly, the legal education gained by students at Bologna and, later, Paris, Oxford and other mediaeval universities allowed them to work for any of the Princes of Western Europe and to argue in many courts -making the profession of law highly cosmopolitan. There was no 'dingo fence' in 2 In so doing, it will expand on views expressed in C. Sampford mediaeval Europe. Indeed, most professions were cosmopolitan -not just the oldest profession but also the most venerated profession -medicine. This applied not only to medicine and law but also the profession of arms where there was a claimed transnational affinity between knights and a code of chivalry setting out how one could and could not fight. Most soldiers did not fight directly for kings but for local lords or as mercenaries following 'captains' of 'military bands' or 'military companies'. They might be part of armies organized by kings. But they might also fight against kings or in civil wars -or for foreign princes as individuals or groups who would fight in return for land or money.
However, the rise of strong sovereign states in the seventeenth century turned these two, most cosmopolitan, professions into two of the least cosmopolitan. Those who like a convenient date look to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which provided the basis for state sovereignty. These transitions arguably commenced long before Westphalia and were never fully completed 300 years later when the United Nations (UN) Charter enshrined key aspects of the Westphalian system.
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The Westphalian Legal Profession
The claim of sovereign states to determine the content of the law within their borders -including which, if any, ecclesiastical law, what form of economic regulation and what, if any, international law was to apply -meant that those who sought to study law would study the law of a particular sovereign state.
Admission to practice was determined by domestic institutions -Courts, Inns of Court and various forms of apprenticeship and professional examination. In common law countries, universities were not initially engaged in educating lawyers for such practice. English law was not even taught at Oxford until 1758. However, after six centuries, even Oxford came around to teaching primarily English laws. 6 For example Chapter 1, Article 2, principles 1 and 7: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members" and "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". The concept of universal standards provided increased support for the human rights instruments which accompanied the Charter. Two other developments profoundly affected the law and lawyering:
1. The rise of printing, which allowed legislation and case law to be disseminated more widely and in far greater detail than had ever been possible.
2. The decline of feudal land tenure, the gradual decline in the importance of land in European economies and the extension of the market led to the idea that landholding typically involved an 'owner' with sole dominion over it.
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Over some 300 years, these developments came to be seen as so entrenched that they were perceived to be natural, and the legal pluralism of pre-Westphalian Europe seemed contrary to the very nature of law. However, the last 10-15 years have seen the emergence of trends that involve profound challenges to the nature of law in Westphalian sovereign states. The challenges to sovereignty include the rise of transnational law -including international law, free trade treaties, the extra territorial reach of United States (US) law and the development of universal jurisdiction. Most of these trends will intensify over the next few decades and could lead to fundamental changes to the nature, practice, structure and content of law over the professional lifetimes of those students we are currently teaching. By the time that students entering laws schools this year (2009) retire in the mid twenty-first century, the law and the legal profession may be as different from its Westphalian sovereign paradigm as that paradigm was to the world of Pepo's students.
The Westphalian Profession of Arms
The profession of arms was also transformed by the rise of the nation state. The European feudal system involved direct loyalty to local lords rather than to princes, kings or, in the Holy Roman Empire, the Emperor. Outside of the feudal system, mercenaries had been a common feature 16 If the soldiers' loyalty and duty were to the nation state, it was inappropriate for them to give their loyalty to, and fight for, one part of the state against another, risking the newly established order which it was the prime responsibility of the state to engender for the protection of its citizenry. Professional soldiers saw themselves as maintaining order rather than contributing to disorder. Similarly, it was also totally inappropriate for a soldier to fight for another state. These principles were not always followed.
Occasionally, the military would break up and join opposing sides in a civil war -something that was seen as the ultimate tragedy for a professional military force. More often, the military would remain unified in suppressing insurgency -or unified in overthrowing governments in coups d'etat -one of the curses of the modern state. On the external front, some states continued to recruit mercenaries, but they were generally looked down upon as not real soldiers. 17 The use of mercenaries became less popular and in the twentieth century there were national and international steps taken to outlaw the use of private military forces. While the monopoly of legitimate force was a matter of definition, in most states, most of the time, the military forces of the state could prevail over any and all other coercive forces ranged against them. 
BUILDING GLOBAL PROFESSIONS AS IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD
Global values and global institutions
The trends towards globalizing the legal and military professions and others are important. Indeed,
given the absence of any equivalent to national governments within the international order, such professions may need to play a disproportionate role in building and sustaining that international order.
The basis for this argument is a narrative that has much influenced my thinking over the last ten years.
Good governance requires the articulation of governance values (for example, liberty, equality, citizenship, community, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and environmental sustainability) 22 and the institutions that can realize those values. Since the seventeenth century, governance debates have centred on sovereign states rather than relations between them. Late seventeenth century states were generally highly authoritarian and justified as such. Hobbes argued that rational people would mutually agree to subject themselves to an all-powerful sovereign to avoid a 'state of nature' in which the life of man would be "poor, nasty, brutish and short". Once internal order had been restored, this social contract did not seem such a good bargain. The eighteenth century Enlightenment sought to civilise these authoritarian states by holding them to a set of more refined and ambitious values -notably liberty, equality, citizenship, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Some of these values were adaptations of classical city state ideals to the much larger polities of the time. Nineteenth century thinkers extended the range of rights championed and added concern for environment and for practical and social equality.
Most importantly, the key to the Enlightenment governance project was a 'Feurbachian' reversal of the way rulers and ruled related to each other. Before the enlightenment 'subjects' had to demonstrate their allegiance and loyalty to their 'sovereign'. The enlightenment proclaimed that 'governments' had to justify their existence to 'citizens' who chose them. Once the reversal of the relationship was suggested, it was very hard to go back.
Values are rarely self-implementing: they require institutions to realise them. I suggest that the legal profession is, and should be, breaking free of its Westphalian shackles. While lawyers cannot directly deploy lethal force, if they are not bound by ethical restraints they can provide advice, which can result in spectacular individual and social harm. Where lawyers give advice on the legality of wars or torture, the consequences can be catastrophic for those who suffer invasion and/or torture. The fact that those who sought selective legal advice may leave office with their reputations shattered is small consolation and an insufficient deterrent. 29 In describing the profession as 'independent', this does not mean that it is entirely self-regulating. Zacharias' essay in this volume points out the central role played by legislation and, especially, the judiciary. However, the main impetus for enunciating and developing legal ethics and the structure and role of the profession comes from lawyers with many of the regulatory and most of the disciplinary decisions in the hands of the judicial branch of the profession. While the abuse of the knowledge and skills of lawyers is not as spectacular as the deployment of military force, it is potentially insidious if the knowledge and skills of lawyers are used to deny justice.
Sometimes globalization makes this task easier -when lawyers forum-shop for jurisdictions wherein their clients can engage in lawful practices, which would be regarded as criminal in their home state.
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A similar question arises with regard to the difference between a lawyer and a 'spin-doctor' -saying whatever suits the client's interest and, in effect, making lawyers figuratively rather than literally 'guns for hire'. I have previously argued that, where the client refuses to have disputes heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, there is a temptation for clients to seek, and lawyers to give, advice they want to
hear. Under such conditions, they are not acting as lawyers but as spin-doctors, no better than the much despised Jamie Shea who was lent by Prime Minister Blair to NATO during the Kosovo conflict.
Egregious examples include some of those who provided opinions to governments on the legality of the Kosovo and Iraq wars 32 and the treatment of prisoners. 33 As with the military, the answer for lawyers must lie in values, ethics, commitment and the institutional means for keeping lawyers to their task.
In both cases, the professionals act, with very few exceptions, on instructions by the commander-inchief or client. However, they do so in an institutional context designed to further the core values of that profession and reduce the likelihood that the professionals' knowledge and skills will be abused. recognizing that the profession of arms may be an ally. The rest of the lecture discusses how this concept might be understood and refined and how it might be strengthened, emphasising the role of the globalizing professions of arms and law.
REFINING OUR UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The 'Domestic' Rule of Law: A Contested Concept with Multiple Dimensions
The rule of law is a majestic phrase with many largely reinforcing and supportive meanings. It stands for a fundamental value or ideal, an ethic for lawyers and officials, the basic principles of constitutionalism and a set of institutions that supports its attainment. While these multiple meanings (6) courts should have review powers (of the exercise of power by others); (7) courts should be easily accessible; (8) discretion of crime-policing agencies should not be perverted.
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The Rule of Law as a fundamental Governance Value
The rule of law is now seen as one of the fundamental values underlying modern states -along with human rights, democracy and the famous trinity of liberté, egalité, fraternité. It was not always so.
The Treaty of Westphalia was, in many senses a tyrants' charter -made by and for the absolutist rulers of the day. It recognized a set of formally independent and equal states whose sovereigns were recognized on the basis of their ability to effectively control the territory of a state. Their brutal suppression of the former rulers they displaced and others who did not accept their right to rule was an indication of sovereignty rather than a disqualification for it. As discussed above, philosophes, lawyers and revolutionaries sought to impose a series of enlightened governance values on authoritarian states.
The rule of law was the first of these values and many states were substantially rechstaats long before they saw even a modicum of democracy and human rights. The rule of law is not only the longest standing of enlightenment values; it is generally the least controversial and is arguably the most fundamental.
The Rule of Law as an Ethic for Officials
The rule of law is a central ethical principle for judges and the legal profession more generally. The profession's central goal is the effective operation of law so that official power is exercised predictably and according to pre-determined rules. The rule of law is also central to most officials including civil servants, the military and, at root, elected officials -power is held in trust to be used only to the extent permitted and for the purposes authorized.
The rule of law has an illustrious history in Europe, the US and many Commonwealth countries. The recent lack of support by the US and the United Kingdom 36 may cause concern for some but it is important to recognize that the US, similar to most P5 members, has a very high degree of compliance with treaties and has been pressing for an enforceable rules-based system in global trade. While more politicians openly argue that the US should ignore international law in the use of force, the legality of American interventions are strongly asserted -indicating that they seem to think that this is important politically and in the court of public opinion.
The Rule of Law as a basic Constitutional Principle
The rule of law underlies and is supported by basic constitutional principles such as constitutional rule and the separation of powers. However, it does not require a formal or written constitution and the concept clearly pre-dates such instruments. What the rule of law does seem to require is a separation of judicial power from legislative and executive power and a means of determining what texts are recognized as laws.
The Rule of Law as a set of institutions
Those who value the rule of law recognize that it can never operate effectively as a purely normative phenomenon (be it value, ethic or principle). It requires institutions to make it effective.
a. If we are to know what law must rule, it is necessary to have an institution or set of institutions that are sources for authoritative texts. Legislatures are the most common but grundnorms can, and generally do, recognize other sources.
b. There is a need for an institution that provides authoritative interpretations of the meaning of those texts in particular circumstances.
Other institutions that can reinforce the rule of law include an independent bar, independent prosecutorial services and, to an extent, police forces. Institutions such as the ombudsmen and independent commissions against corruption can make the laws more effective and ensure that powers are used for the purposes for which they are entrusted.
The Rule of Law and nascent Integrity Systems
Since the late 1990s, it has become increasingly accepted that the way to avoid corruption and other abuses of power require an 'integrity system' -a set of norms (formal and informal), institutions and practices that serve to promote integrity and inhibit corruption. All effective integrity systems involve some basic institutional arrangements associated with the rule of law -especially courts and a legal profession that are not indebted to the holders of political power and can review the actions of powerful institutions to determine whether or not they are within power. These institutions are the oldest and longest standing elements of the integrity systems of western states.
These meanings are now well developed, widely supported and generally achieved in the domestic affairs of most modern democracies and several autocracies. They are mutually supportive so that the partial achievement of each supports the fuller achievement of all. They are far less developed in international affairs and face obstacles that lead some to doubt the possibility of an international rule of law or international law itself.
Apparent Difficulties in Developing and Operationalizing an International Rule of Law
There are many difficulties in achieving the above meanings and dimensions of the rule of law in the international sphere. I will not go into detail of previous conceptual work done by myself and my colleagues on reconceiving the rule of law in a more global world. Much of this can be found in a collection of essays and the last chapter of my most recent monograph. 37 The general conclusion of this work is that the rule of law transfers conceptually very well across cultures and into the international sphere. Chesterman set out three possible meanings of the international rule of law -the application of rule of law principles to states and other subjects of international law, priority of international law over other forms of law and the direct application of international law to individuals. 38 I have adopted the first mentioned.
Fundamental Values
The concept of the rule of law used here is derived from the domestic law and the differences between domestic and international law may lead some to query its applicability. The problem is not so much one of conceptualization but of commitment. Low expectations about the effectiveness of international law may undermine its perceived legitimacy and the willingness of international actors to take it seriously. In particular, concern is expressed about the commitment of the US and its allies to contravention of international law may become more difficult and less attractive. The alternate view is that the US should seek to rebuild and then strengthen international law as insurance for the time when their military power is equalled or surpassed.
Ethics for officials
The above problems of commitment to the international rule of law lessen the likelihood that international law will be at the forefront of the ethical considerations of lawyers and officials. Lawyer's ethics, formed around the laws and institutions of nation states, may not show the same respect for international law as domestic law. Indeed, Anglo-Saxon systems of legal ethics are based on the duties to courts. 39 Where that domestic law reflects and advances other important ideals, lawyers may have much greater attachment to domestic law.
Constitutional principles
The limited reach and scope of international law mean that some may doubt the applicability of familiar constitutional principles on the UN. This aspect is reinforced by the lack of familiar institutions such as legislatures and executives and the fact that the institutions that operate internationally are often hybrids, compromises and historical oddities.
The limitations of international law
International law emerges via different means (there is no real equivalent to a legislature), applies to states rather than citizens, has a radically different extent and lacks an all powerful sovereign body to enforce it. However, most international law is followed most of the time despite the lack of a sovereign power with the monopoly of legitimate force. In fact, all laws are followed for a number of reasons -of which the nature and certainty of sanctions for breach is but one, and for most actors not the primary one.
Institutions
39 While duties to clients are important, both kinds of duties are determined by courts and a lawyer's ethical duties are based on being 'officers of the court'. As the duty to client is ultimately determined by the court, it is not surprising duties to court take priority over duties to clients to the extent that there is a conflict. To me, there should be no conflict if the relevant duties are properly construed. In my view, the duty to the client is part of the lawyer's duty to courts and the administration of justice. Lawyers representing clients in an adversary system are doing their duty to the court by ensuring that justice is done via a vigorous contestation of issues in front of that court. See Sampford, C. The largest problems for the international rule of law lie in the lack of institutions that create, interpret and enforce international law. This lack of effective institutionalization inhibits the development of the rule of law in its other senses. The lack of a legislature is not a fundamental problem for the rule of law.
It makes change difficult but all that is needed is a set of clearly agreed sources, the means by which those sources generate authoritative legal texts, and the hierarchy of sources in cases of conflict.
There is a court which can provide authoritative interpretations of those texts and of any conflicts between them. What is more, the ICJ is harder to stack than the highest courts of any other jurisdiction in the world. The problem is, of course, the lack of compulsory jurisdiction and the limited number of cases that can therefore be heard before it. 40 This makes it much harder for the law to give clear guidance to those who want to be bound. The lack of an effective court that sits regularly also makes it difficult to develop and enforce ethical codes for international lawyers. 
ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
One could conclude that, in many areas where the rule of law seems most needed, it is as distant as it would have seemed to those living under the largely absolutist regimes that emerged in Western
Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia. The fact that the heroic efforts by lawyers and revolutionaries over several centuries led to a remarkable transformation in those states may offer little comfort. The international community cannot wait that long and cannot sustain the violent struggles that were often necessary for the rule of law to emerge domestically. However, the rule of law is a very strong domestic ideal on which we can build and support. An ideal that is not only endorsed, but in many cases sincerely so, by various leaders' summits. To make the attainment of an international rule of law realistic, there needs to be coordinated action to address some of the institutional limitations of international law. Lawyers can and should take a lead in such action -just as they did in the development of the domestic rule of law and the institutions that underpin it. This is not the time or place to set out a comprehensive strategy for building the rule of law in international affairs to match the rule of law in domestic affairs (something we hope to be closer to at the end of the abovementioned projects). However, I will suggest some things lawyers may do and the reasons they may find unexpected allies in the military.
Developing and Promoting the Rule of Law as a fundamental governance value in international affairs
Just as lawyers were major contributors to the development and promotion of the rule of law in domestic affairs, so they should be in international affairs. However, they should not be so as narrow lawyers but as lawyers who understand the philosophical, political and economic issues it raises.
Indeed, they should recognize that the rule of law was developed at a time when those disciplines had not yet become distinct. While mastering these disciplines in their entirety is not a realistic goal for individuals, it is for groups of lawyers who respect those disciplines and bring their insights to bear.
If the rule of law becomes a fundamental value of the profession and a value that it uses to justify the profession, lawyers need to reflect carefully and debate publicly its meaning, value and relationship to the nature of the profession and its work to a global community.
Ethical Standard setting through codes
Lawyers can contribute to the articulation of more specific codes for lawyers and others -not least the Such codes cover a variety of issues but centrally concern how entrusted power is handled and a commitment to international law and the rule of law in international as well as national affairs.  Member states and their delegates to General Assembly (GA), United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and international bodies (analogous to codes of ethics for parliamentarians in domestic systems).  Military forces which are acting under UN authority and military forces engaging in international action -reflecting the same kind of respect for international law and particularly the UN Charter that they are expected to show for domestic laws and domestic constitutions.
The nature of the code development would vary depending on the work already undertaken and completed by others. In all cases, the code development should consider the dilemmas, apparent and real conflicts of duties, as well as the pressures and temptations of practice that may lead participants to 'read down' their ethical duties. However, the focus of the work will vary depending on the codes and principles already in place and the degree to which those codes and principles are controversial. For example:  where there are rival codes or principles, it is very important to tease out the reasons for disagreement and make suggestions; and  where most of the relevant ethics codes are domestic (for example, practicing lawyers and, to a lesser extent judges), it is important to deal with issues involving the extension of existing codes, potential conflict between codes, the relationship between the duties to domestic courts and clients and relevant duties to international courts and clients.
In all cases, the relationships between the codes must be considered carefully by examining the ways in which they may unintentionally conflict and ways in which they may be mutually supportive (for example, in the complementarity of the ethics of judges and advocates).
Once relevant international codes for lawyers acting and advising in international matters are developed, their principles should be incorporated into domestic legal ethics codes so that respect for international law and the rule of law in international affairs is built into the codes by which most lawyers practice. Similar domestic implementation should be followed in professional civil service codes and military ethics.
Other forms of ethical Standard setting
The creation of codes is a high priority for a number of reasons.  There is a current opportunity to do so with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) project and there is a great deal of disquiet about the 'torture memos' discussed elsewhere in this volume.  The creation of an international code will emphasize the responsibilities of international lawyers to the international legal system separately from their responsibilities as lawyers within their domestic jurisdictions.  Such codes can provide inputs for those who want to reform the domestic legal ethics codes following the torture memos.
While the creation of codes is a high priority and is a natural activity for lawyers, it should be recognized that this does not exhaust the ethics of this or any other profession. If legal ethics were coextensive with codes of ethics, two counter intuitive consequences would follow. First, it would mean that there would be no sense in complimenting or criticizing the ethics codes. Second, it would make no sense to criticize the ethics of some and praise others. It would be pointless to compliment Lord Goldsmith for the first advice and to criticize him for the second advice. It would also be pointless for to refer to the temptation for clients to seek, and lawyers to give, the advice the client wants to hear rather than the advice the client should hear if they are facing court. If the client has no intention of accepting the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction, they should make it clear that they will not give such advice or, if they do, they will not be acting as lawyers and there should be no privilege.
Before there are codes, people can debate what kind of conduct they admire as ethical and which they criticize as unethical. They can advocate new rules to bolster these normative claims. Even where there are codes in place, they generally set minimum standards of behaviour. There is room to articulate and practice according to what the proponents believe to be higher standards. These will help set standards even while they are supererogatory. While they may affect code development, there will always be room for such higher standards, and they are part of a dynamic profession.
Legal Regulation and Institutional Development
In all cases, the pressures for and against compliance should be considered. While the initial focus of code development would involve the clarification of ethical standards for those subject to the pressure, and those who may be applying the pressure, suggestions would also be made for institutional changes that remove or reduce dilemmas, temptations and pressures for unethical behaviour.
Simultaneously, the legal profession should be actively involved in strengthening institutions that will support the international rule of law and the participation of all states in it. Lawyers made tremendous contributions to the institutionalization of the rule of law domestically -not always succeeding and risking occasional death or imprisonment.
1. Urge all countries to (re-)commit to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to any country that accepts. 44 2. Urge all states to commit to the use of force only subject to international law, with countries only going to war if there is a public statement by the most senior relevant legal authority (for example, Attorney-General or Solicitor-General) that, in their independent judgement, the war 44 As had the American Bar Association on several occasions. is legal and that the government is prepared to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in any case brought against it.
3. If governments refuse to accept the jurisdiction of courts of competent jurisdiction, the legal profession must recognize the temptation to seek and the temptation to give, legal advice the client wants to hear -especially if that advice is published. The profession must be very clear that lawyers should not give way to that temptation on fear of disbarment.
4. Such states should be treated in the same way as other delinquent clients who seek to evade courts of competent jurisdiction (generally by fleeing it) 5. Lawyer-client confidentiality might be erased where the government is not prepared to defend its action in the ICJ -especially where they are likely to attack the court. The lawyer's duty to law and the system of justice mean that they must report the planned commission of a crime.
Note that it is hard to see any argument for privilege if the client does not intend that the matter go to a court of competent jurisdiction given that the point of privilege is to determine what may not be discovered or heard in court. 11. Follow a similar practice with military leaders who breach their ethical duties. 45 While most of these goals require the action of politicians, lawyers should take the lead in identifying the legal and institutional changes required. In many cases, the relevant leaders will be lawyerpoliticians.
ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
I will not spend as much time on the role of the military as my research and expertise lies primarily in the profession of which I am a part. However, the following points may be helpful.
As emphasized throughout this lecture, lawyers should seek suitable allies within the military. During the lead up to the Iraq war, two of those most implicated, in what seems to most international lawyers to be a serious breach of international law, were lawyers turned prime ministers. Prime Minister Blair appears to have been instrumental in persuading Lord Goldsmith to produce a short and misleading opinion claiming the proposed war would be legal, omitting the caveats in his original advice. 46 On 6
March 2003, Prime Minister Howard told the Australian parliament that there was ample legal authority for the war although virtually no legal authorities supported it. 47 Some members of the military behaved much more creditably. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the Chief of the UK armed forces, refused to cross the Kuwait border without written legal advice that the war was legal. 48 If the lawyers providing written advice for public consumption had been prepared to acknowledge the limited support their arguments had and the unlikelihood of being able to succeed in a court of competent jurisdiction, 
CONCLUSION
This lecture endorses the idea that the rule of law should become as fundamental a governance value within the international community as it is within sovereign states. The legal profession should take a lead in developing our understanding of that value and the ethical and institutional means of realizing that value. The military are a potential ally and Americans have traditionally been, and hopefully will again become, natural allies in this process. Our good work in the twentieth century has been tarnished by a poor end to the 20 th century and a poor start to the twenty-first. However, those who are either unduly optimistic or pessimistic of major institutional change might do well to recognize that history is a 'long game'. But the way that long game will play out is not a matter of prediction but of action.
What lawyers and soldiers do during the next 50 years will be crucial to how it plays out. Lawyers were critical to the crystallization of the rule of law in 17 th century England -soldiers all but undid it and a bloody civil war almost destroyed the country. This century -or more likely quarter century -we are playing for much bigger stakes. The international rule of law has been sufficiently conceptualized. This is the time when the international rule of law may be articulated, advocated and institutionalized. But we cannot afford a global civil war along the way. This is why the international rule of law must be a key goal of the newly cosmopolitan and globalizing legal profession -and the increasingly cosmopolitan profession of arms must go along with them -not just to avoid conviction in the ICC but because of their conviction that internationally, as well as domestically, their use of force must be lawful.
If it happens it will be because the lawyers of today act with high principle and they are joined by the It is our time and even more the time of those who are now leaving law schools
Ten years ago, I was asked to deliver the final keynote the World Congress on Legal and Social Philosophy held in the World Trade Centre. I was asked to talk about sovereignty and intervention and I spent a good deal of time talking about the international rule of law. I drew a link between domestic and international rule of law and suggested that it was a great tragedy that the US, so long a leader in articulating and practising the domestic rule of law was setting such a bad example in the international rule of law. When I described illegal bombing from 15,000 feet was a new 'high crime and misdemeanour' I was told I must be a Republican. Had my interlocutor known of Eisenhower's quote, he might have pressed me. But the answer is that the rule of law is neither Republican nor Democrat, Liberal or Labour, Left or Right. It is a fundamental governance value, a basic rule of the gameindeed it is the commitment to the idea that the game HAS rules.
The one really worrying trend is the abandonment of the rule of law by some who consider themselves conservative -or the oxymoronic category of 'neo-conservative'. The corollary of that is that the argument for the rule of law has so often to be run by the left and those genuine conservatives who fight for it are often against those who call themselves conservatives and that those conservatives who fight for it are treated as if they are left wing radicals.
Let us hope that the implosion of the oxymoronic 'neo-conservatism' allows conservative, liberal and social democratic lawyers can make common cause on the rule of law -and take a lead in its realisation internationally as well as democratically -bringing with them the profession of arms and the vocation of politics.
